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Abstract
An economy benefits from advances in technical frontiers only when new technology comes
into general use. This paper measures the diffusion of computing equipment at a time when computing
technology underwent dramatic technical improvement. These data shed li^t on the long lag between
advances in computing technology and advances in economic performance of users. There is little
evidence that long lags were produced by the "slow diffusion" of new technology embodied in new
hardware. "Average practice" in computing advanced as rapidly as "best practice," lagging it by a
maximum of 6 to 7 years.

1. Introduction
Best-practice confuting technology has advanced rapidly in the last 30 years.' Yet, it is hasty
to infer that economic welfare inproved at the same rate. What matters for economic welfare is the
advance of technologies in general use, not necessarily the advance of the best practice, which very
few may put into use quickly. Despite all the attention paid to the advances in best practice, little
economic research examines the diffusion of computing technology or the economic value of systems
in use.^
This paper provides measures of diffusion for 1968 to 1983, a time wiien the best practice
technology underwent rapid improvement. The analysis shows that average practice advanced rapidly
in the United States. In most years, average practice advanced at a rate comparable to best practice,
irrespective of the measure used for either. Average practice never lagged best practice by more than 6
to 7 years and usually by less. Compared with many other studies of the diffusion of important
historical innovation of the last 200 years (e.g., Mansfield [1968]), this represents an extraordinary fast
diffusion of new technology.
These results support two conclusions. First, the paper's results relate to several diffusion
mechanisms, analyzed in David [1989], that could account for the long lag between advance of best
practice computing technology and productivity growth. The analysis shows that there is no evidence
to sipport the simplist possible mechanism, that hardware embodying new technology diffused slowly.
This result is consistent with David's [1989] emphasis on other mechanisms, e.g., the time it takes to
learn about new capabilities and the re-organize business enterprises.
' See Gordon [1989], Dulberger [1989], Cole et al [1986], Triplett [1989], Bemdt, Showalter, and Woolridge
[1990], Bemdt and Griliches [1991], and Oliner [1993a]. Despite some disagreement, most indexes of
mainframes yield advances in quality/price on the order of 20% to 25% a year over the last thirty years.
^ Exceptions include: Bemdt and Morrison [1991], Bemdt, Morrison and Rosenblum [1992], and Bresnahan
[1987].
In the same spirit, the paper highlights others ways in which best practice frontiers for
computing, usually estimated with hedonic methods (Tripplett [1989]), may provide a deceptive
indicator of the economic benefits accrueing to computer users. The basic economics of the problem is
straightforward and well-known: Each old user reacts to new technology with a different adoption
response. Advances in best practice do not necessarily translate into uniform economic benefits across
all computer users because new practice does not uniformly replace old practice everywhere very
quickly. The open issues addressed in this paper are enpirical, i.e., how varied is the response across
users and how does this variation influence measurement of the benefits from technical change?
2. Data on the Installed Base of Computer Systems
This study uses data from IDC, the best historical data available on the size of installed base
of computers and their rental prices. No other comparable data source exists for the 1960s and 1970s.
Only a few studies of the computing market (e.g., Micheals [1979], Phister [1979], Flamm [1987a,b],
Dulberger [1989], Oliner [1993a]) have used data from a similar source and none ever oq^loited all
facets of it. Before beginning the analysis, the paper must discuss the limitations these data impose on
the measure of best and average practice. More detailed descriptions of these data are included in the
appendix.
The analysis begins with the December 31, 1968 report and end with the January 1, 1983
report. It begins with 1968 because this is the first year in which IDC distinguished between the
number of installations within the US and outside the United States. It ends with the 1983 report,
because all of IDC's census underwent a massive reclassification after 1983, the last year that IDC
maintains its mainfi-ame file separately from other types of computer systems.
This paper accepts IDCs definitions of what is a mainfi-ame computer (as opposed to a mini-
computer, a small business system or a desktop system). This makes my estimates conparable with
Phister's [1979] and Flamm's [1987] description of the difilision of computing equipment, which used
more aggregate IDC data.^ It also makes my results comparable to diner's [1993a] analysis of the
retirement patterns among IBM mainframes, which uses similar EDC data for IBM systems. As a
secondary benefit, employing IDC's defmitions removes any suspicion that the defmition was chosen
arbitrarily or chosen to manipulate the results (though I have found that most of this paper's analysis is
robust to small changes in definitions). Over the entire 16 year period, these data concern the installed
base of over 350 different conputer systems. The appendix provides a list of the important included
systems.
Three biases arise from maintaining exclusive use of IDC's defmition of a mainframe. First, in
1%8 and 1969 IDCs early definition of a mainframe is too broad, including some systems that they
reclassify as "Digital Dedicated Application" in 1970.'* This will influence some of the results below.
Second, more redefmition problems arise on a smaller scale when EDC began several data bases for
systems other than mainframes (i.e., minicomputers, small business systems, desktop). Its researchers
occasionally move a system into the mainframe category that was not there previously or move a
system out of the mauifi"ame category that was there previously. Most of these redefmitions do not
matter, but a few influence the results below. The most important case is IDC's decision to include the
IBM System 36 in the sample in 1976 (estimated installed base at 5000 units) and exclude it from
mainframes thereafter (but include it in "small business systems"). Third, by the end of the sample, the
difference between mainfr'ames and some large mini-computers (aka. "super-minis") becomes blurred,
raising questions about the survey's completeness. The main issue is wiiether EDC includes in the
mainfr"ame category all the super-minicomputer systems that were close substitutes for mainframes. A
^ Phister identifies several years in which IDC revised the reported number of installations in previous years,
particular for IBM models in 1967-1972. In those cases, Phister's reported updates were used.
* This occurred as part of a general reclassification of all IDC censuses.
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reasonable case could be made that BDC included most relevant systems.^ A reasonable case could also
be made that they did not, especially by 1983.^ Overall, the omissions do not bias important results
below except in one place, which will be noted
3. A fiist look at different vintages.
IDCs surveys do not record when a user installs each new acquisition However, IDC does
record the date (year-month) at which each model of a system was first installed anywhere in the
United States. For exanple, the IBM 360/20 was first installed in November 1%5, the IBM 370/125
in May 1973, and the IBM 3031 in February 1978. A summary of product introductions is presented
in the appendix. Call this number VINTAGE. VINTAGE provides one measure of the technology
embedded in each system, because systems developed later and introduced later tend to be better in
several respects than those developed and introduced earlier.
As a measure of technological capability, VINTAGE has two significant drawbacks. First, it
does not measure differences in the performance of different systems introduced at the same time.
Thus, VINTAGE is likely to be a poor measure of success in inter-system competitioa This deficiency
is difficult to correct because there is no standard method for using installed base to wei^t results
(e.g.. See Greenstein [1993b] for one such attempt). A second inportant drawback is that VINTAGE
^ It is not clear wiiether the money spent on super-minis ever amounted to more than a small fraction of the
amount of money spent on mainframes. According to the 1983 IDC census for mini-computers and mainframes,
the value of installed base associated with super-minicomputers came to roughly half the value of all mini-
computers, or roughly 15 percent of the value of the installed base of mainframes. IDCs census differs from the
other censuses, particularly CBEMA's, because IDC includes several systems as mainframes (i.e., those from
IBM) which others classify as super-minicomputers. This matters a great deal by the end of the sample. For
example, according to the CBEMA [1992], in 1976 mainframe shipments reached over 5 billion dollars, while
the total spent on all minicomputers was 1.8 billion. By 1982, however, mainframe shipments reached 10.6
billion and minicomputer shipments reached 7.7 billion. CBEMA does not state what fraction went to super-
minicomputers.
* The most questionable omissions in IDCs mainframe tables are those regarding the VAX models from
DEC, and similar competitive models from other firms such as Prime and Data General.
overlooks differences between cohort and age effects. It assumes that the same measured difference
between an earlier and later technical vintage means the same thing in two different periods. That is, it
presumes that a 1968 technology is better than a 1965 technology by exactly the same amount that a
1981 technology is better than a 1978 technology, and so oa Some corrections are possible (see
below).
The advantage of using VINTAGE for measuring technical capability is that it available for all
systems in all 16 years of the data and it is easy to use. Second, over the long run, VINTAGE
provides a quick and reasonable measure of improvements in new technology embedded in successive
generations of computing equipment, which is fme for the diffusion issues addressed in this paper.
Third, this measure does not rely on an arbitrary estimate of best practice technology, nor does it rely
on a company's announcement regarding the product. Rather, it uses a historical event, when the
product first came to market. Thus, it is an appealing defmition for an economic study.
Most important, VINTAGE provides a bound on the degree of technical knowledge embodied
in a system This occurs for three reasons. First, the installed base of systems in use must be younger
than VINTAGE indicates because the date of first installation is older than the date at which most
users install their rented or purchased model. Second, VINTAGE overstates a system's true technical
age in situations where new installations of an old vintage technology are using technology retrofitted
with improvements. Lastly, VINTAGE does not correct for typical utilization rates of especially older
systems. In other words, it overstates how important old systems may be by assuming a "one-hoss-
shay" model for old systems - if a system is installed, then it is still in use. In sum, VINTAGE will
give the most pessimistic picture possible. If the results are positive in spite of this bias, then
VINTAGE does a good job.
Rather than analyze the vintages of systems in each year, it is easier to examine their
"technical age," which makes various years comparable. The "technical age" of a system is defined as
the difiference between the ciate of observation and a system's vintage-Hiat is,
TECHAGE = YROBS - VINTAGE,
v^ere YROBS is the date of observatioa^ All systems introduced on the same date have the same
technical age. The same strengths and weakness that apply to VINTAGE also apply to TECHAGE.
4. The Distribution of Technical Age.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the changing technical age of US mainframe computer
installations over the entire 16 years (The underlying data are presented in Table A 1 in the appendix).
A few technical generations dominate the distribution of the technical age over the first years of the
sample. The first major technical cohort in the data is associated primarily with the introduction of the
IBM system 360. In the end of 1968, there were 17580 systems installed whose technical generation is
1965. In each of the next two successive years this technical generation grows to a peak of 27040
systems, which was over 40% of the systems in use in 1970. This technical cohort continues to be
quite large for many more years, making up more than 20% of the systems in use up to 1974. The
second major cohort is associated with the IBM system 3 and system 370 (spread primarily through
vintages 70-73). By year-end 1974 more than one quarter of the installed systems in use are associated
with this new technical generatioa The importance of the system 370 and system 3 continues for a
few more years. As will be clear below, no other single system introduction influences the
measurement results as much as the technical cohorts associated with the system 360 and 370.
Figure 2 presents three different estimates of the average technical age of mainframe
' Since each survey samples the market at the start of the year, YROBS-for the first year of the sample will
equal 1968.0. YROBS will equal 1983.0 in the final sample year.
computing systems in the United States (Table A2 in the appendix present the raw calculation). Three
nieasures are used because the inferences are sensitive to the measure used The average technical age
of all installations emphasizes popular systems. The average technical age, wei^ting by the rental
value of the installations, emphasizes the newer systems, the bigger systems, and popular systems.*
The median technical age of the systems installed de-emphasizes any skewness in the distribution
Figure 2 illustrates the trends. The median has the most unusual pattern. Because of the
difilision patterns associated with the system 360 and 370 the median technical age jumps discretely
year to year. It grows from 1%8 until 1973 at a rate of one per year, which reflects the influence of
the 360 cohort. As many users bought the system 3 and upgraded their 360 systems to 370s the
influence of the 370 cohort rose. The abnpt decline in the median age of systems between 1973 and
1974 reflects the accumulation of users shifting away from the 360 and to the 370 and system 3. Both
the shifts away from the 360 and to the 370 were necessary to produce this abrupt change. It is
difficult to make any strong inferences from these movements in the median after 1974. After 1974 the
median technical age increases for a few years, stays virtually unchanged for a few years, and then
falls markedly in the last couple of years.
The measures of the average technical age of systems stay remarkably close to one another,
despite the different wei^ting used in each case. Not surprisingly, these measures are smoother than
the median. They too show a rising average technical age over the early part of the sample. The
technical age wei^ted by value rises 2.3 years from 1%8 to 1979 and stays just above six years from
1975 until 1983. The unweighted technical age rises by 3.3 years from 1968 to 1980 and also stays
above six years from 1975 onward
The rise in the technical age over the first half of the sample years is not surprising. The
* It may also slightly exaggerate the importance of older systems, as Phister [1979] warns. See appendix for
fiirther discussion of these and other potential biases.
confuting market had just ejqDerienced dramatic growth in the late 1960s and only moderate growth in
the early 1970s. The average age of|^ems grew as users held on to their systems and did not retire
them. By the mid 1970s, however, users phased out enough of the oldest systems and replaced them
with newer systems, resulting in no increasing trend for these averages. The stabilization of the
average technical age in the later years of the sample is surprising, because the continuing existence of
some very old systems should bias the measure iq^ward as the market grows older. It seems that the
only way to get a stabilization of the average technical age is for buyers to acquire new systems at a
fast pace.
Figure 3 verifies the above conjecture. It shows the different quartiles of the vintages of
computing capital stock (it also shows the maximum and minimum). The percentage of young systems
is growing in the early 1980s and the age of the oldest quartile is falling. Thus, despite the possibility
that users could and did hold on to old computing stock, the average age does not change much over
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Note that the abrupt change in the maximum technical age between
1976 and 1977 reflects one system's retirement and does not reflect any important economic factor.
Is an average technical age of 6 to 7 years a high level or a low level? The obvious
benchmark to compare TECHAGE against are several classic diffusion studies. Mansfield's [1968]
summary of the diffusion of 12 important innovations in bituminous coal, iron, steel, brewing, and
railroads, shows enormous variance, as does Griliches* [1957] analysis of the adoption of hybrid seed
com, and David's [1975] analysis of the McCormick Reaper. Most innovations take longer than 10
years to be fully adopted and several take 20 or more years. The comparison is not perfect because
these and similar studies analyze the adoption of the first generation of a product innovation (e.g.,
automobile, radio, television) or process innovation (e.g, continuous mining machine, diesel
locomotive), not the tumover in technical vintages of a stock of systems in use. Despite this
precaution, a technical age of 6 to 7 years seems small in conparison This measure is biased towards
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a pessimistic answer. New generations of computers must be tuming over every few years to produce
this result Very few of the classic studies just mentioned show adoption taking a few years.
A few tentative conclusions emerge. First, the market displays a pattern consistent with the
heavy growth of new users in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s this growth slowed and much new
techrwlogy adoption is being made by experience users. Consistent with this story, estimates of the
levels of best practice frontiers are certain to be closer to average practice in the early years of this
sample, v^en first adoptions are made. Similarly, best practice frontiers may provide a deceptive
picture of the economic benefits from technical progress in the later years because the gap between
best and average practice is likely to be greater for many experienced users. Second, users added new
systems at a fast pace in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This last result is surprising, given the rising
importance of small substitutes for mainfi-ame computers. Third, there is some indication that new
technology comes into use quickly, particular in comparison to previous major innovations. However,
this conclusion needs more careful analysis of tumover of computers from different technical
generations.
5. Technical frontieis and the advance of average practice
The ultimate goal of this section is to measure the speed with wdiich "best practice" diffuses
into general economic use. This section corrects for the main deficiency of TECHAGE, that one unit
of TECHAGE means the same thing in every year, though each vintage's capabilities differ.
What is meant by "best practice" and "average practice" in a heterogenous product market?
Economists typically represent best practice by a "frontier" of models that can provide combinations of
product traits at the lowest cost. It follows that "average" practice is a measure of the typical type (and
typical cost) of systems in use.
This paper employs traditional hedonic estimates of the best practice frontier in computing.
Researchers have usually found that the rate of improvement in the performance per dollar of new
systems lies somewiiere between 15% and 25% per year over the whole sample. However, these rates
vary year to year and over periods. Unfortunately, most researchers do not estimate changes in the
hedonic fixjntiers over the entire period of interest, from the early 1950s until 1983 ~ exceptions are
Gordon's [1989] estimates and Triplett's [1989] synthesis of estimates from different researchers.
For estimates of technical frontier, I employ Triplett's [1989] best practice index for computing
equipment (Tables 4. 13A and 4.14.). This index was Triplett's evaluation and synthesis of the best
hedonic research on computer technology. Triplett's indexes start in the mid 1950s and go all the way
until 1984. They cover all vintages and all manufacturers in the computing stock. Triplett's index
completely covers the industry, which makes it the best choice for this paper.^
Even with an appropriate index, how should it be used to estimate best and average practice?
This is particularly important in lig^t of the recent discussion about the existence of multiple hedonic
frontiers operating in the market at the same time.'° Is it better to assume that all systems for sale are
priced on the same frontier or not? In a putty-putty world, all systems are on the same frontier. Then a
system's price and hedonic index are sufficient for comparing different systems' value. If systems are
not on the same frontier, what is the appropriate scheme for differentiating between different
applications and intensity of use?
The strategy of this paper is to compute a bound on average practice even if system are on
' Since Gordon's index and Triplett's index do not sharply differ in the long run, the results are not sensitive
to this choice.
'° Fisher, et al. [1983] argue that the computer market is subject to "disequilibrium." That is, the introduction
of new products frequently disrupts expectations, market pricing, and investment patterns. Buyers may lock
themselves into investments, but regret the decision as conditions change unexpectedly. In the short run, buyers
may be uncertain about the true capabilities of the latest systems and may defer new purchases until better
information is available. As a result, the market may never settle into uniform prices for systems with similar
characteristics. Hedonic researchers, such as Dulberger [1989] and Oliner [1993a], interpret this to mean that new
products and dder commercial systems may not lie on the same hedonic frontier. Departures from the frontier
may differ with age. Dulberger find evidence in favor of disequilibrium, while Oliner finds a more mixed bag.
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different frontiers. Thus. I assign tiie worse possible frontier to each system The frontier associated
with a system's VINTAGE provides such a lower bound, i.e., the lowest teciinical frontier for a system
is usually realized when a system is first introduced This is a lower bound because this index will not
change with market conditions even thou^ new systems may improve with the introduction of more
software or other peripherals. Prices of old systems may also decline in response to new entry driving
the technical frontier outward"
Table 1 and Figure 4 show this measure of the computing capital stock. More precisely, Table
1 computes the quality adjusted value for each system by dividing the introductory price of the system
by a hedonic index for new systems that year. In other words,
EUj = ?,M,
'Miere Pj^ is the price of system i introduced in year v, wiiich is its first year, and H^ is the hedonic
value of systems of vintage v. EUj represents "efficiency units" or the quality embedded in a system
at its introduction, so the number does not change over time. This computation is exactly ri^t if
sellers price all new systems on their vintage hedonic surface and the productivity of each model does
not dramatically change over time. Otherwise, EU should be interpreted as a lower bound Table 1 and
Figure 4 present the average EU for each year. This equals
AVE(EUJ = [Z Q, EUi ]/ [S QJ,
'
' Particularly if the price for a system declines over time or if the technical capabilities for systems improve
over the production lifetime of a systenx See Oliner [1993a] for evidence that discounting from list prices
follows a general predictable pattern over the commercial life of a system. See Hartman and Teece [1990] for a
similar discussion about strategic pricing in the mini-computer industry.
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wiiere Q, is the installed base of model i in year t. Msdian EU is done in an analogous manner. The
table ends in 1981 because this is the last year IDC publishes rental price data. A mean and median
were used (instead of a total) because these measures minimize biases from arbitrary changes to the
definition of a mainfi^ame. The absolute value of the mean is higher than the median because in any
year the distribution of prices of systems is skewed. That is, the larger systems are more e?q)ensive
than the smaller systems are cheap.
Consistent with the previous figures, there is no evidence in this table that diffusion is slow.
The median and mean start at different levels, but grow at roughly the same rate. The mean grows at
22.6 percent a year, while the median grows at 23.6 percent a year. The mean shows steady growth
after 1970. The decrease from 1969 to 1970 was likely caused by EDC's redefinition of a mainframe,
which resulted in the exclusion of many systems from the 1970 census that had been in the 1969
census. The median shows steady growth through out the whole sample, with a few exceptions in the
early to mid 1970s. The decline from 1969 to 1970 is an artifact of abrupt changes in the sample of
systems. IDC removed several newer systems, mostly minicomputers, from the survey.'^
The rate of growth shown in Table 1 compares closely with the hedonic index, presented in
Table 2. The index declines at 19.8 percent a year from 1958 to 1984, with the biggest declines
coming from 1958 to 1970. Thus, the decrease in the cost per unit of quality translates into roughly
the same rate of growth in the quality of the installed computing capital. Sometimes the rate of growth
was even faster.
6. Diffusion lags
This section defmes and analyzes diffusion lags, which measure how many years average
'^ Overall, these results do not seem to be a consequence of a change in tfie typical size of systems in this
sample over time. All experiments with changes to the sample of systems yielded similar results.
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practice is behind best practice. A diffusion lag is the difference between average practice in one
period and its equi'.alent best practice in a previous time. Diffijsion lags are easy to conpute with
logistic curves in single-product, single-vintage markets. A similar index in a multiple vintage,
multiple product market involves a bit more effort.
The paper's measure of the diffusion lag computes the average practice in one year. Then, it
fixes that value and searches for the previous year in which best practice frontiers were at this level.
The difference in time provides a measure of the "vintage-equivelant" of a given year's average
practice. More precisely, let H^ be the best practice value for all systems of vintage v, and let
AVEPRAC, be the average practice for year t. This paper uses the AVEPRAC in time t and compares
it against previous H, interpolating where necessary. In otherwords, the diffusion lag, DIFLAG, is
defined by the following procedure:
If AVEPRAC(t) = H„then
DEFLAG = t - V.
This procedure takes advantage of the most data available.
Different defmitions of "best practice" and "average practice" provide different insights. As
argued above, hedonic measures can represent the technical frontier in time t for all systems
introduced in that year. It follows that average practice is the average (or median) of these values over
all systems in use.
Table 2 and Figure 5 present the results for 1968 through 1983. The results of this procedure
are striking. For the average, diffusion lags grow over the early and middle part of the sanple,
reaching a peak of over 10 years in 1979, 1980, and 1982. The lags essentially level off in the last
five years of the sample. The results show that average practice changes at over 14.4 percent a year
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from 1968 to 1983, which is just under the 16.4 percent change in best practice during the same years.
The diffusion lags lengthen because a number of very old systems are still in the installed base in the
late 1970s. Users may or may not use these old systems as intensively as they use new. However, an
average does not correct for intensity of use.
One possible correction is shown in Figure 5 and presented in Table 2 under the heading
"median practice." It computes the hedonic frontier value of the median system in use. This definition
is not as sensitive to the existence of older systems. Of course, this measure will also abruptly change
any time the median TECHAGE abnqDtly changes. The diffusion lag associated with the median
practice is markedly different than average practice, as ejqjected It grows over the early years of the
sample, but levels off by 1972. It drops abruptly in 1974, reflecting the abrupt change in the median
system, as described in the discussion about the median techage. This drop is in contrast to the average
diffusion lag. In addition, the median diffusion lag never exceeds 7 years, which is markedly less than
the average diffusion lag. This maximum is reached in 1972, 1973, 1977, 1979, 1980, and 1981. The
turnover in the number of young systems is sufficiently fast to prevent the installed base of old
systems from mattering as much. I conclude that the median is a less reasonable measure when there
are abnpt changes in the median system, as in the mid 1970s. However, it is a more reasonable
measure of long run trends under the assumption that users do not intensively use very old systems.'-'
So it is probably more appropriate for the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Several conclusions emerge from Table 2 and Figure 5. First, the ovcthII rate of diffusion of
new technology to users embedded in new technology is quite fast, especially considering that all the
above measures represent a pessimistic estimate. The average conputer usct possessed new technology
that was improving at roughly the same rate as the best practice frontier, though the level of average
'^ This result is also consistent with the industry perception that the "typical" user turns over their system
every 4 to 6 years. If the "typical" user makes this purchase 1 to 3 years after the introductic»i of a product, then
a median of roughly 6 to 7 years will result
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practice obviously lagged behind Second, the gap between the levels of best and average practice
grew in the first five years, as one would expect in a relatively new market. Thereajfter, the retirement
patterns of the older vintages largely determines the measured diffusion gap. Third, despite the
generally positive overall picture, there is considerable variation in the ejq3erience of users. A
substantial minority continued to possess old equipment, much of it representing generations that were
easily 10 years old or older. This observation focuses attention on the need to better understand the
relationship between the installed base of old computing equipment, the intensity with wtiich it is used,
and users' tendency to make another purchase.
7. Gosing remari^s
This paper's analysis aimed to prevent any hasty inference about economic welfare based
solely on estimates of growth in the computing technical frontier. What matters for economic welfare
is wtiat technologies users employ, not only what is available or what was recently bougtit. In terms of
this motivation, the results were quite positive. Average practice generally lagged best practice by a
maximum of 6 to 7 years and was often shorter. While this answer is somewhat sensitive to
assumptions about the intensity of use of old systems, it is biased towards a pessimistic answer. A
maximum of 6 to 7 years is hardly slow, especially in comparison to the dififlision of other important
innovations.
The analysis hi^i^ted several important features of the diffusion of computing. A few
vintages and con^uter system models greatly influence the results in some years. It follows that any
measurement of diffusion will be sensitive to the valuation placed on popular systems, particularly the
IBM system 360 and the IBM system 370. This is a disturbing conclusion, given the different hedonic
estimates for these systems (Gordon [1989], Dulberger [1989], Oliner [1993a]).
Second, the analysis found a general correlation between advances in technical frontiers and
.
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advances in average practice, but also found much variation around the trend A large number of users
continued to hold onto old equipment and did not tumover technical generations quickly. By
inpliction, a conplete description of the advance of average practice requires a complete survey of
the e^qjerience of new and popular systems, and also a survey of the use of old vintages. Thus, at
best, hedonic frontiers alone are a weak approximation of the general economic benefits from technical
advance in the short run These observations highli^t the need to better understand the relationship
between the elasticity of demand for confuting, the intensity of use of old technical vintages, and the
adoption of new technology (e.g.. See Bresnahan and Greenstein [1993]). Further research on the
intensity of use of old equipment and its retirement patterns (e.g., Oliner [1993a], [1993b]) can
partially address this gap in knowledge.
The paper's results have another important implicatioa Economists have been puzzled by the
absence of any of the expected productivity improvements that should follow technical advances in
conputers. One set of possible hypotheses emphasize that, average practice lagged far behind best
practice. This paper provides a quantitative test of the simplist slow-diffusion mechanism, that new
technology embedded in hardware diffused slowly. The analysis rejects this mechanism because
average practice advanced at a rate comparable to best practice and the diffusion lag associated with
new technology embodied in mainframe hardware was typically short. Thus, to remain viable, the
slow-diffusion hypothesis must focus on the slow development of software, human learning, and
appropriate organization forms, as suggested in David [1989], if it is to survive as a viable ejq^lanation
for the productivity puzzle.'"*
This paper's experiment ends at an interesting turning point in the mainfi^ame computer
'* These is not likely any supporting evidence in the diffiision of products complementary to hardware, such
as software or peripheral components. Recent hedonic research shows a rapid rise in the technical frontier for
many different peripherals (Cole et al [1986], Oliner [1993b]). Since the sale of these peripheral^ positively
correlates with sale of processors, there is likely to be little difference in the diffusion lag for peripheral
technologies in the United States.
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industry. Super minicomputers had already begun cutting into the mainframe market share by 1983
and personal computers became much more ubiquitous within businesses after 1983 (Bresnahan and
Greenstein [1993]). One might expect the retirement patterns and acquisition patterns to change as a
result Further research may be able to identify whether the diffiision lags increased or decreased after
1983.
Further work could construct estimates of the demand for computing capabilities. Demand
estimates will say something about the degree of change in the surplus of users due to technical
improvement. This is the spirit of Flamm's [1987a] estimate of the benefits from improvements in
computer systems, Bresnahan's [1987] research on the use of conputers in the fmancial services sector,
and Trajtenberg's [1989,1990] estimates of the welfare gain from the adoption of CT scanners. Since
the data in this paper includes data on quantity and prices, it is possible to work in this direction
Greenstein [1993b] contains such research.
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Table 1
Median and Average Efficiency- Units
1968-1981
Year Mean Median
1968 22.28 5.00
1969 22.33 7.04
1970 19.33 10.55
1971 25.41 10.55
1972 35.90 10.55
1973 45.10 11.41
1974 54.99 11.41
1975 65.19 11.41
1976 71.02 13.70
1977 92.65 28.92
1978 135.16 48.40
1979 209.45 63.52
1980 323.40 70.04
1981 529.00 136.61
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Table 2
Average versiis Best Practice
1968-1983
Hedonic Average Median
Ypar Best Average Diffrision Median Diffusion
Practice Practice Lag Practice Lag
1957 3640.9
1958 2895.5
1959 2422.7
1960 1863.6
1961 1377.3
1962 927.3
1963 700.0
1964 568.2
1965 454.6
1966 286.4
1967 231.8
1968 190.9 794.2 5.4 568.2 4
1969 172.7 671.7 5.8 454.6 4
1970 159.1 556.3 5.8 454.6 5
1971 122.7 503.6 6.4 454.6 6
1972 100.0 422.8 6.8 454.6 7
1973 98.6 380.9 7.6 286.4 7
1974 80.3 313.0 - 8.2 159.1 4
1975 73.2 274.5 8.8 159.1 5
1976 65.7 229.4 8.9 159.1 6
1977 51.4 224.2 9.8 159.1 7
1978 34.5 199.1 10.2 100.0 6
1979 29.6 186.4 10.7 100.0 7
1980 23.9 168.7 10.7 98.6 7
1981 21.8 136.6 10.3 80.3 7
1982 20.4 116.0 10.7 65.7 6
1983 16.3 91.4 9.6 34.6 5
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Appendix
Al. Data documentation
These data on computer prices, quantities, and vintages come from the archives of the Qiarles Babbage
Institute at the University of Minnesota, ^\flich contains a collection of industry "censuses" from International
Data Corporation's (EDC) EDP Industry Reports (EDP/IR). This paper also makes use of a set of EDP Industry
Reports contained at the Library for the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University. Patrick McGovem
began compiling this census in 1962 in Computers and Automation magazine. It continued in modified form
under IDC auspices from the mid 1960s onward. IDC annually surveyed most mainframe users and suppliers in
the country and estimated the number of installations of each type of computer system. In addition, until 1981
EDC estimated the monthly rental at which an average type of the system leased. After 1981 they estimated an
average purchase price for the system.
The IDC data on the installed base of each model is the right magnitude, though not precise, especially
in capturing yearly changes. IDCs own literature warns against the hazards of inferring net sales from changes
in the data on installed base. The problem is that they update their figures for tvvo reasons: (1) Real changes in
the holdings of users; (2) changes in lIXTs information about (proprietary) sales activity, both in the present and
in the past. Patrick McGovem recalls (in a private communication) that most suppliers except IBM cooperated
with lEXT, which is why IDC had to undertake a major revision of the data pertaining to IBMs systems (Phister
[1979] contains a complete set of these revisions).
Phister [1979] clearly believes that IDCs estimates are the best among the available alternatives. He
states on pg. 250 "It is my opinion that IDCs staff, files, and data sources make that organization's published
statistics the best available." Nevertheless, he warns about several potential problems that could influence
calculations using these data. For example, due to occasional revisions of previous EDP/IR reports, Phister is not
convinced that IDCs estimates of the size of installed base are precise. However, many of his uses of these data
indicate that he believes IDC got the general order of magnitude correct.
EXilberger also questions the accuracy of IDCs estimates of installed base, while conceding that they are
the best publicly available. One especially difficult problem is that IDC may underestimate the number of users
who upgrade their systems (Dulberger, private communication). However, she relies less directly on [DCs
numbers. She used them only to determine the size of her data sample of systems for sale in a given year. For
each year's sample she included processors associated with systems whose installed base was still growing, since
these systems are likely to still be experiencing positive sales.
Given these concerns, I also subjected these data to some internal consistency checks, which they
readily met The history of each new system was examined. Did the development of its installed base follow a
reasonable pattern of growth, i.e., several years of growth followed by several years of decline? The absence of
such a pattem would bring into question the plausibility of the data.
Similar issues influence the use of IDCs rental price data. IDC estimated the price of a typical system
configuration. Phister believes that the prices for obsolete systems are too high, since IDC would use the last
offered price for a system in the absence of any recent transaction. Nonetheless, Phister uses these prices for
estimates of the value of installed base. He believes that the bias in old prices influences only a few of the
systems in the United States. Flamm reaches a similar conclusion before using Phister's estimates for a few
calculations. In addition, using these prices is not without precedent in the hedonic literature. The prices for new
systems used by Gordon (as well as many others) are very similar to those used here. Gordon's prices for his
sample after 1977 were taken from Computerworld. which is published by IDC.
These researcher's experiences show that IIX's estimates are probably the right order of magnitude, but
also subject to measurement error. These observations warrant a cautious research strategy. No strong
conclusions should rely exclusively on one data point. Strong inferences will arise only from procedures in which
cumulative measurement errors wash out.
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Table Al
The Technical Age of the Installed Base of Conputers
1968-1983
Age 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
<1 549 338 493 476 1500 1353 1509 2121
1-2 1651 1182 2920 3138 4073 5211 3539 3900
2-3 17580 2653 2698 3839 7119 3315 6392 5433
3-4 3491 25824 719 2935 4965 9702 5137 5964
4-5 4168 3031 27040 730 3605 3816 16596 5204
5-6 3223 3157 4152 28240 759 3773 2691 17987
6-7 1882 2946 1477 910 27791 5942 3953 1974
7-8 6642 2424 3195 1329 856 17923 45,01 3381
8-9 220 4784 1087 2475 1251 1295 12244 4021
9-10 184 203 3259 908 2277 1889 1063 10229
10-11 76 142 360 2730 712 480 1611 912
11-12 124 58 131 309 2401 859 375 1387
>12 503 532 90 141 303 2232 2636 2523
Total 40293 47274 47621 48160 57612 57790 62247 65036
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
<1 6888 2507 1028 700 947 3483 873 5940
1-2 5152 4512 6870 2802 2157 6937 6556 5409
2-3 5186 4949 6355 7923 3994 3499 10851 6190
3-4 5927 5882 5480 6312 7129 4380 3285 9563
4-5 4845 6291 4424 5765 4779 5839 4406 3137
5-6 5824 4093 5712 4079 6202 3486 4147 3392
6-7 17632 4276 3547 5218 3801 5832 2378 3094
7-8 1338 13123 3078 3035 4056 3349 4711 2331
8-9 3169 742 8810 2713 2419 3082 2800 3902
9-10 3360 2136 547 7624 2280 2038 2105 2250
10-11 8671 2703 1680 502 6065 1984 1511 1340
11-12 813 6469 2186 1569 401 4925 1601 1054
>12 3089 3417 8306 9718 9013 7681 10418 9358
Total 71894 61100 58023 57960 53243 56515 55642 56960
Table A2
Technical age o£ a typical system
1968-1983
Year Average Average Median
weighted weighted
by value by inflt.all
1968 4.29 4.18 3.50
1969 4.62 4.60 3.75
1970 5.13 4.99 4.66
1971 5.85 5.46 5.33
1972 5.79 5.53 6.33
1973 5.60 5.67 6.91
1974 5.53 5.63 4.00
1975 5.69 5.93 5.00
' 1976 6.05 5.85 6.00
1977 6.37 6.45 6.25
1978 6.48 6.51 5.66
1979 6.52 7.02 6.25
r 1980 6.38 7.38 6.58
i 1981 6.20 6.87 6.25
! 1982 6.61 6.77 5.50
i 1983 6.16 6.25 4.83
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